This paper is concerned with two closely related problems: the first is the general question of border-line cases; the second is a suggested identification of the notions of ambiguity and vagueness. In the first part of the paper I propose to discuss border-line cases in the following way: I shall say what is meant by “border-line cases,” discuss their genesis, enumerate and evaluate the different methods of resolving such cases, and make a brief comment or two the bearing, if any, (...) that such cases have on logical theory. In the second part it will be suggested that the notion of vagueness can be reduced to the status of a special but important case of ambiguity; I hold that such a reduction would effect both an economy and a clarification. (shrink)

The traditional attitude of philosophers towards the analysis of language is that it may have some corrective value, but can make no positive contribution to philosophy. The world must be investigated in itself: an analysis of the language in which we describe it will perhaps give us greater insight into the description, but not into what is described. Many philosophers have been suspicious of language, considering it a hindrance rather than an aid in philosophical investigation. This tradition has a long (...) history, some of whose high points we can mention briefly. (shrink)

The traditional attitude of philosophers towards the analysis of language is that it may have some corrective value, but can make no positive contribution to philosophy. The world must be investigated in itself: an analysis of the language in which we describe it will perhaps give us greater insight into the description, but not into what is described. Many philosophers have been suspicious of language, considering it a hindrance rather than an aid in philosophical investigation. This tradition has a long (...) history, some of whose high points we can mention briefly. (shrink)